Abstract. Thomason [4] showed that a certain modal logic L ⊂ S4 is incomplete with respect to Kripke semantics. Later Gerson [2] showed that L is also incomplete with respect to neighborhood semantics. In this paper we show that L is in fact incomplete with respect to any class of complete Boolean algebras with operators, i.e. that it is completely incomplete.
Introduction
In 1974, two modal incompleteness theorems were published in the same issue of the same journal. Fine [1] presented a logic above S4 and Thomason [4] presented one between T and S4, and both showed that their logics were incomplete with respect to Kripke semantics. In 1975, a paper by Gerson [2] followed in which he showed that both logics were both also incomplete with respect to neighborhood semantics. Then, in 2003 Litak [3] showed that Fine's logic is in fact as he calls it completely incomplete, i.e. it is incomplete with respect to any class of Boolean algebras with operators (or BAOs for short). It is know that Kripke frames correspond to the class of complete, atomic and completely distributive BAOs and that neighborhood frames (for normal logics such as the ones we are considering) correspond to the class of complete, atomic BAOs. In the present paper, we show what one might almost call a complement to Litak's result, i.e. that Thomason's logic is also completely incomplete.
2. An incompleteness theorem 2.1. Algebraic preliminaries. When considering an arbitrary complete BAO A below, we will always assume there is some Kripke frame W, R such that A = A, ∧, −, 0, ✸ is a subalgebra of ℘(W ), ∩, c , ∅, m R , where c is set-theoretic complementation with respect to W and for X ⊆ W and m R (X) := {w ∈ W | ∃v ∈ X (wRv)}; the Jónsson-Tarski representation theorem tells us that any BAO is such a subalgebra up to isomorphism. We will make use of a few observations about suprema in A. Let {a n | n ∈ ω}, {b n | n ∈ ω} be arbitrary subsets of A. First of all, we will use without mentioning the fact that n∈ω a n ≤ n∈ω a n . Secondly,
as a n ≤ b n ≤ b n , so a n , being the least upperbound of {a n | n ∈ ω} in A, must be below b n . Thirdly,
for if a n ∩ b n = ∅ but a n ∧ b n > 0 then a n ∩ b n > 0. If this were not the case, then we would get b n ⊆ b n \ a n ∈ A, contradicting the fact that b n is least in A. So, there must be some b i such that b i ∩ a n > 0, and now we know that a n a n \ b i , for otherwise a n would not be least. It follows that there must be some a j such that a j ∧ b i > 0; however this contradicts our assumption that a n ∩ b n = ∅. It follows that (2) is true. Finally,
Since for any k ∈ ω and w ∈ ✸A k = m R (A k ) it must be the case that wRv for some v ∈ A k ⊆ a n ⊆ a n , so that w ∈ ✸ a n , whence ✸a n ⊆ ✸ a n . It follows that ✸a n ≤ ✸ a n .
A case of complete incompleteness. Consider the formulas
Let L be the logic containing all propositional tautologies, A, B, C, D and E and closed under modus ponens, substitution and necessitation (this is the same logic as found in [4] ). It is not hard to see that T ⊆ L ⊆ S4. We will see below that the latter inclusion is strict, because S4 ∋ F / ∈ L.
Proof. Let A be a complete BAO on which B, C, D and E are valid 1 , but F is not. We will show that A |= A, proving the statement of the lemma.
The fact that A |= F must be witnessed by some a ∈ A such that ✷a ✷ 2 a. Since by C, ✷ 2 a ≤ ✷a, it follows that ✷ 2 a < ✷a. For n ≥ 1 we define
where c \ d := c ∧ −d. By the above, we already know that b 1 > 0. To inductively show that all b n > 0, suppose that b n > 0, but b n+1 = 0. Then substitute 2 ✷ n−1 a for p in E, so we get
which is a contradiction, so it must be that b n+1 > 0. This completes our induction.
(the base case n = 2 follows immediately from E). We will show that (4) must also hold for n + 1. We only consider j = n + 1 and i < n (for if i = n, we can immediately apply E and i, j ≤ n is already covered by (4)). By our induction hypothesis, b i ≤ ✸b n and by E, b n ≤ ✸b n+1 , so we have
We are abusing language here, for we should really say A |= B = 1 instead of A |= B. We trust that confusion will not ensue, however.
Reverting to definitions, we find that
It follows that (4) holds for n + 1, so by induction (4) is true for all n ≥ 2. Now we define the following elements of A:
(Note that this is where we use the assumption that A is complete.) We will use these elements to show that A is not valid. First of all, as n≥0 b 3n+i ⊆ n≥1 b n , it follows by (1) that q i ≤ r for i = 1, 2, 3, so q i → r = 1, whence A 1 = A 2 = ✷1 = 1. Secondly, by (4), for any n ≥ 1 there must exist a k ∈ ω such that b n ≤ ✸b 3k+i , whence n≥1 b n ⊆ n≥0 ✸b 3n+i . By (1) , this means that
where the latter inequality follows from (3). Therefore, r → ✸q i = 1, so
Combining all this, we find that
However, we have r = q 1 ∨ q 2 ∨ q 3 , and as the q i are disjoint, this means that r ∧ −q 1 ∧ −q 2 = q 3 . By the above, r ≤ ✸q 3 , so
It follows that ✸(r ∧ ✷(r → q 1 ∨ q 2 )) = 0, contradicting A as b 1 > 0. We conclude that A |= A.
For C some class of BAOs, we define ∆ |= C Γ if for every A ∈ C, A |= ∆ only if A |= Γ.
Corollary 2. Let C be any class of complete BAOs. Then {A, B, C, D, E} |= C F .
Proof. See [4] . Thomason proofs the lemma by showing that the veiled recession frame, which is in fact (as it should be) an incomplete BAO, validates L while ¬F can be satisfied on it.
The lemmas give us the following:
Theorem 4. L is completely incomplete.
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